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The paper examines the contemporary scene of Jewish fundamentalism, focusing on its
twomajor wings: the separatist Ultra-Orthodox, and themore culturally accommodating
but politically radical Zionist Orthodox Settlers and would-be Temple Builders. Both
those segments of Judaism have been demographically and institutionally on the rise in
the last generation and have made their impact on the political scene, changing the
character and image of Judaism as a whole. The essay comes to offer an historical and
sociological context to the formation, development and growth in numbers and im-
portance of the two camps. It points to the diversity within the two camps and relates to
major institutions, leaders and theological concepts. It also examines the meaning of the
term fundamentalism in late modern Judaism and points to the fact that while there are
obvious differences between the Ultra and the Zionist Orthodox, there are also striking
similarities. These demonstrate themselves, among other features, in the centrality of
scriptural narratives to the two groups, including the idea of holding a special place in
God!s plans for humanity, and the idea of the imminent or eventual arrival of the mes-
sianic times.
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Introduction
Ample media coverage, in recent years, has focused attention on the separatist
Ultra-Orthodox communities, as well as on the more culturally accommodating
but politically radical groups of Jewish Settlers and would be Temple-Builders in
Israel. Those segments of Judaism have been on the rise in the last generation,
both demographically and institutionally. As the recent news from Israel dem-
onstrate these fundamentalist groups are currently prominent on the political
scene, affecting national policies. The declarations and actions of some members
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of the groups in relation to Israeli settlements and the Temple Mount, or Haram
al-Sharif, have played a part in the escalatingmistrust betweenMoslems and Jews
in Israel, the territories it occupies, and beyond.
Few, however, are aware of the history and development of the Jewish fun-
damentalist movements and the varied characteristics of the many groups that
make up these camps. This paper aims to place the movements within the larger
social, cultural and religious contexts in which they have evolved and to which
they have reacted. The paper will point to two major camps of contemporary
Jewish fundamentalists that differ from each other in their theologies, communal
structures, life styles, and political choices. It will also point to mutual influences,
common characteristics and shared perceptions.
Jewish religious fundamentalists take affirmative stands, upholding and
strengthening tradition in face of other options in Jewish culture. They insist on
the validity and authority of the Jewish sacred scriptures, see special merits in
studying the texts, and are highly protective of the narratives the texts offer. Both
groups are messianically-oriented, but while the Zionist-Orthodox believes in
taking an active role in history, the Ultra-Orthodox have often objected to such
attempts.1 While the Ultra-Orthodox take their model from the alter heim,
Eastern European Jewish society before Communism, Nazism and emigration to
western countries or Israel brought it to an end, Zionist Orthodox groups have
come instead to promote the Land of Israel as a focal point of their political
vision.2
1. Fundamentalist Ultra-Orthodoxy
The largest of the religious fundamentalist movements within contemporary Ju-
daism is Ultra-Orthodoxy.3 This diverse fundamentalist movement started in
Central Europe, in the nineteenth century, in reaction to movements of accul-
turation and liberalization.4 It spread to Jewish communities in other parts of the
world, changing and evolving in response to new environments and challenges.
Until the turn of the nineteenth century, the term “orthodox” was rarely used
to define Jews, but matters changed in the early nineteenth century when leaders
of more militant forms of reactive traditional Judaism appeared on the scene,
declared themselves “orthodox” in contrast to what they considered to be the
erring reformers. Until such alternatives appeared within Jewish society, Jews
could move away from the faith by converting to another religion, but they could
not pick and choose on an individual basis what elements of their tradition they
1 Ravitzky 1996, chapter 4.
2 On the ethos of Ultra-Orthodox society, see Friedman 1991.
3 Ibid.
4 Katz 1973.
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wished to observe. Now, such choices became possible. In Western and Central
Europe, as well as in theNewWorld, many Jews liberalized, easing up or giving up
completely on daily observance of their tradition. A number of rabbis and lay-
personsmade deliberate efforts to bring Judaism to par with the cultural norms of
urban European societies.5 Those deciding to uphold tradition considered the
liberal reformers to bemisguided, if not outright traitorous. They set out to create
a stern uncompromising version of traditional Judaism that would not walk the
line of compromise and eventual demise of the tradition.
Ultra-Orthodoxy has not been a self-designation. Most members of this camp
prefer instead terms that express their understanding of themselves as the utmost
loyal followers of the Jewish faith, using at times the terms “Torah Camp”, or
Haredim, Eager to Follow God, to describe their ideological commitment and
cultural environment.
Michael Silber has pointed out that theUltra-Orthodox reacted not only to the
rise of reform or secular forms of Jewish life, but also to the appearance of ac-
culturated forms of Orthodoxy whose holders had wished to make observant
forms of Judaism compatible with modern life.6 The Ultra-Orthodox have
claimed that even minor attempts at acculturation or reform could be the be-
ginning of a decline in commitment and deterioration in the standards of ob-
serving the faith that end with the complete disintegration of the tradition. The
first Ultra-Orthodox leaders lashed out at earlyOrthodox thinkers, such asMoses
Mendelssohn, and even at SamsonRaphael Hirsch andAzriel Hildesheimer, who
were, in fact, founders of a more firm form of Orthodox Judaism and militated
against reforms of the faith.7
If Moses Mendelssohn was the thinker most associated with the beginning of a
moderate, acculturated form of Jewish Orthodoxy, Moses Sofer (Schreiber) of
Pressburg (Bratislava), known as the Hatam Sofer (1762–1839), was the early
founder of Ultra-Orthodoxy. Spiritual leader of the utmost Eastern urban center
of the Habsburg Empire, Sofer established a yeshiva that became a bastion of
anti-modernism in Central and Eastern Europe. The Hatam Sofer pun on a Tal-
mudic ruling, “Kol hadash asurmin haTorah”, theTorah forbids everything that is
new, became a battle cry of Ultra-Orthodoxy. It has reflected the dialectics of the
newmovement, which has come aboutwithin the context ofmodernity yet carried
a banner of opposition to modernism and acculturation, and while thoroughly
opposing reforms, made profound theological and practical changes in the tra-
dition. It was perhaps not surprising that the Hatam Sofer held expectations for
the imminent arrival of the Messiah to usher in a global righteous age and brings
about the redemption of Israel. In contrast to the newly emerging circles of liberal
5 Mayer 1995.
6 Silber 1992.
7 Kahana 2015. On Hirsch, Hildsheimer and the rise of German Jewish neo-Or-
thodoxy, see Breuer 1992.
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Jewswho adopted at that time progressivemillennial views and hoped to build the
Kingdom of God on Earth through education, the spreading of the values of the
Enlightenment, technological advancement, and political reforms, the Hatam
Sofer believed that the messianic era would not be ushered in through human
efforts, but rather through divine intervention and busied himself in trying to
calculate the exact date of its arrival. In that regard there are some striking
similarities between the ideologies and attitudes of Ultra-Orthodoxy and those of
fundamentalist movements that have come about in other religious traditions in
the late modern era.8 Like other such movements, Ultra-Orthodoxy should be
understood as a reactionary development in the history of Judaism. If in previous
generations, there was more leeway for rabbis to issue accommodating rulings,
and for laypersons to balance the demands of day to day life with those of tradition
and the halakha, now regulations and standards have become more stringent and
greater emphasize put on separation from outside cultures including other groups
of Jews.
In their declared ideology as well as in their own minds, the Ultra-Orthodox
created nothing new.They have seen themselves asmerely preserving the customs
and faith of their fathers and forefathers, which, they have asserted, had remained
unaltered throughout the ages. Religious traditions, however, are dynamic by
nature and fundamentalist groups, such as the Ultra-Orthodox, tend to be par-
ticularly active in re-designing their traditions so as to make them more insular
and immune to outside influences. While opposing changes, Ultra-Orthodox
leaders and groups have implemented huge changes in Jewish customs and
standards of observance as well as in the relation between different groups of
Jews.9 For example, the Ultra-Orthodox unwillingness to recognize more accul-
turated or accommodating rabbis as legitimate has brought the older concept of
More de Atra, local rabbis as the authoritative halachic figures in their own ter-
ritories, to an end. The dynamic nature of fundamentalism is also evident in the
significant developments that have taken place as new generations of Ultra-Or-
thodox have come on the scene. As a generalization, the movement has become
more strict and demanding throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
The dynamic nature of the movement has been accompanied by huge inner di-
versity.While from the outside it might look like a homogeneous camp, it is in fact
a large and diverse religious-cultural movement.10 Divisions have to do with the
areas from which the Ultra-Orthodox have arrived from as well as between
Hasidic and non-Hasidic forms of leadership, authority and worship. The camp is
composed of numerous communities that share the basic cultural values and
adhere to the same narratives on the course of Jewish history, yet differ in small
8 For similar attitudes among Christian fundamentalists, see Marsden 1982; Weber
1983.
9 Katz 1998.
10 Friedman 1991.
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details of appearance and customs. There are also varying shades of separatism
from the outside culture. These communal divisions often result in inner struggles,
the building and dissolving of coalitions and public institutions and even verbal
and physical skirmishes. For example, most Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Israel lend
their support to political parties that represent their interests vis a vis the Israeli
government. However, a minority group considers such political maneuvers to be
in violation of the community!s values and boycotts the elections.11
While positioning themselves in opposition to modernity and the general
culture, the Ultra-Orthodox have chosen, especially since World War II, to live
their lives in large cities. They have made extensive usage of modern technology
and international transportation. This has allowed them to build global networks,
and unite over common causes. Most Ultra-Orthodox Jews are of Eastern Eu-
ropean origins, andmany of them consider traditional Eastern European customs
to represent normative Judaism. The separatist communities in Germany were
more acculturated than the Ultra-Orthodox groups in Eastern Europe and en-
couraged their male members to obtain general education and professional
training, alongside Jewish traditional schooling, a reality that made some Eastern
European leaders treat them with suspicion. By the turn of the twentieth century,
the Germans and Eastern Europeans cooperated in establishing political bodies
that came to represent the conservative elements of Orthodox Judaism in the
public and political spheres. By that time the Ultra-Orthodox were reacting
strongly to the rise of the Zionist movement, and especially to its Orthodox wing,
Hamizrahi.12 Leaders of Ultra-Orthodox communities, such as the Munkatcher
Rebbe, Chaim Elazar Spira (1868–1937) and the Satmar Rebbe, Joel Teitelbaum
(1887–1979) shared the conviction that the Jews were forbidden “La!alot Baho-
ma”, to re-enter history as active agents. They therefore opposed the Zionist
agenda vehemently, viewing it as a futile and dangerous attempt. The founding of
an Ultra-Orthodox party, Agudat Israel, came to present a political alternative to
Zionist voices.13 While inner divisions, such as between Hasidic Jews and “op-
ponents”, did not disappear, Eastern and Central European traditionalists were
now willing to put aside some of their differences and cooperate in order to fight
the modernists and strengthen the ideological and spiritual walls around their
communities.
After World War I, Agudat-Israel became active in a number of Eastern Eu-
ropean countries and in Palestine, expressing opposition to the Zionist movement
in international forums. Still, in the mid-1920s, the Ultra-Orthodox party began,
on a pragmatic basis, to cooperate with the Zionist establishment. Its leaders
wished to get their share of certificates for immigration to Palestine as well as
budgets and allocations of land. This created a backlash to the more radical
11 On Ultra-Orthodox life and institutions, see Heilman 2000.
12 Ravitzky 1996.
13 On Agudat Israel, see Bacon 1996.
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elements among the Ultra-Orthodox in Jerusalem. In 1937, Amram Blau (1894–
1974) and others, establishedNeturei Karta, Defenders of the City, a group that in
the 1950s–1960s galvanized Ultra-Orthodox antagonists of the newly created
state anddemonstrated in Jerusalemagainst the desecration of the Sabbath.14This
group gave voice to a minority within the Ultra-Orthodox. Most chose to operate
within the system in order to protect their community!s interests. Avraham
Yishaya Karelitz (1878–1953), known as the Hazon Ish, emerged as a spiritual
leader, giving voice to Ultra-Orthodoxy at large, in opposing the conscription of
women as well as of yeshiva students.
The deferment from conscription, which the Israeli governments granted to its
Ultra-Orthodox coalition partners, proved detrimental to the development of the
community, which, since the 1950s, turned studies in yeshivot, rabbinical aca-
demies, previously a privilege of a small elite, into routine for all young men.
While Zionist Orthodox also obtained some rabbinical studies, for the Ultra-
Orthodox it has become a way of life. Men continue their studies after marriage,
while their wives work for a living.15 As a rule, the Ultra-Orthodox remain in
coalition with governments, whoever heads them, to ensure the continuation of
this arrangement and the integrity of their communities.
Many observers thought, in the aftermath of the Holocaust, that Ultra-Or-
thodoxy would not be able to overcome the deadly blows that the Nazi death
machine and the Communist regimes have dealt the traditionalist Jewish com-
munities in Eastern Europe. However, to the amazement of many, including the
Ultra-Orthodox themselves, the community has risen up, like a phoenix, from the
ashes, showing signs of vitality and growth. Contrary to warnings, America, Israel
and centers inAustralia, Canada, England andBelgium, proved to be congenial to
the reconstruction and thriving of Ultra-Orthodox communities. While pre-
viously traditionalist Jews, who settled in the New World, saw a need to accul-
turate quickly in order to accommodate successfully to their new environments,
the post-Holocaust Ultra-Orthodox migrants saw matters differently. They
wished to maintain many of their customs, including their distinctive attire, and
built an independent educational infrastructure that has enhanced the com-
munity!s ability to retain most of its children within the fold.
The separatist, seemingly archaic, character of Ultra-Orthodox societies
brought sociologists and anthropologists, as well as journalists and writers, to take
special interest in the various aspects of their lives. Some are fascinated by the
arranged marriages that are the norm in the community, while renegade female
writers, such as Yochi Brandeis or Judith Rotem, point to the sometimes difficult
position of women, who are married of young, and who carry most of the burden
of raising large families. Ultra-Orthodox women give birth to averagely five and a
14 Inbari 2016.
15 There is an extensive literature from the perspective of women on the division of
labor in the Ultra-Orthodox community.
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half children in the United States and seven children in Israel, about three times
more than liberal Jewish women in these countries.16 Especially in Israel, most
Ultra-Orthodox live an economically frugal existence. In spite of an impressive
network of mutual aid and extensive government support, many in community
live in poverty, depriving themselves of the luxuries of western consumer soci-
eties.17
Relationships between the Ultra-Orthodox community and the liberal seg-
ments of Israeli society have become strenuous. Many secular Jews resent the
separatist nature of the Ultra-Orthodox community, and the refraining from
economic activity of somanyUltra-Orthodoxmen. Likewise, theUltra-Orthodox
have not celebrated Israeli civil holidays and have not recited prayers for the
safety and well-being of the state. The exempt from military service has been a
huge source of contention in a country that has had ongoing conscription since its
inception.18
Still, the community has been on the growth. In addition to a remarkable
demographic growth, since the late 1960s, it received unexpected reinforcements
from a post-modernist movement of return to tradition that has brought tens of
thousands of youngmen andwomen to abandonopen liberal societies and join the
more conservative Ultra-Orthodox.19 Rejecting much of the modernist world-
view, which their grandparents! generation had embraced, the new adherents
included artists, soldiers, former Kibbutz members, and children of the veteran
Israeli elites and, in America, also academicians and professionals. The growing
trendhas boosted themorale of theUltra-Orthodox.Here are liberal Jews turning
their backs on the freedoms and opportunities embodied in the open, secular
society, “coming back” into the fold. A number of Ultra-Orthodox groups and
leaders decided to create venues of outreach in order to further enlarge the
community!s ranks. Their mode of evangelism is based on the understanding that
becoming observant and joining Ultra-Orthodox life is a long process involving
extensive studies. For that purpose they have created a large number of yeshivot
for beginners, a novelty in Jewish life.
The growth of theUltra-Orthodox community and the self-understanding of its
members, who see themselves as representatives of the true and authentic tra-
dition, has affected the more acculturated Zionist Orthodox. The trend since the
1960s has been towards more rigid observance and greater acceptance of Ultra-
Orthodox norms. By the 1980s, Zionist Orthodox have attempted to combine
both sets of values and standards.20 The Hardalim, Ultra-Orthodox Zionists,
16 For example, Rotem 1992.
17 See Daum / Rudovsky 1997.
18 On Israeli liberal resentment of Haredi society, see Ilan 2001.
19 Davidman 1993.
20 On the background to this trend, see Aran 1991.
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coupled Ultra-Orthodox norms of piety and observance with a messianic na-
tionalist faith. Many in the Settlers movement have promoted this combination.
In the 1980s–2010s, the veteran, almost exclusivelyAshkenazi,Ultra-Orthodox
community, was both strengthened and challenged by a large movement of reli-
gious revival and return to the roots of Mizrahi Jews in Israel. Previously, most
Jews from Middle-Eastern and North-African countries were mildly traditional,
with only a minority choosing secular outlooks or adhering to Orthodox norms.
The newmovement changed that reality andbrought tens of thousands ofMizrahi
Jews to adopt both Ultra-Orthodox standards of piety and anti-modernist
stands.21 The movement also promoted ethnic pride and the preservation of
Mizrahi culture and tradition. It created parallel political, educational, rabbinical
and welfare institutions similar to those of the veteran Ultra-Orthodox com-
munity andused its newpolitical power to obtain extensive government support.22
The political influence of the Ultra-Orthodox has been on the rise in Israel. As
a rule, the Ultra-Orthodox parties offer the government backing in matters that
relate to security, foreign-policy, and the economy, in exchange for allowing them
exemption from military service, cultural autonomy and financing for separate
educational and housing systems. Ultra-Orthodox parties often became essential
members of the coalition, and the budgets allocated for their community!s edu-
cational and housing projects have grown considerably. Similar developments
have taken place on the local level, such as in Jerusalem!s municipal politics,
where the Ultra-Orthodox have successfully demanded, in return for their sup-
port, to have their neighborhoods closed to traffic on the Sabbath and holidays.
This has affected the character of Jerusalem, where many neighborhoods and
schools have becomeUltra-Orthodox. Outside of Israel, the Ultra-Orthodox as a
rule do not run for offices, but lend their support to those candidates that respect
their cultural separatism and educational autonomy. The Zionist Orthodox have
been active on the political front.
2. The Zionist Orthodox
Zionist Orthodoxy has come on the scene a short while after the rise of political
Zionism. The group represented a minority voice within both Jewish Orthodoxy
and Zionism. Its proponents established HaMizrahi, a moderate political party
that saw its mission in carving a niche for observant Jews who supported the
Zionist agenda. HaPoel Hamizrahi, which combined Labor politics with a mini-
malist form of observance, became a larger political party, although the two
parties united after the birth of the state of Israel.
21 Leon 2009.
22 On Mizrahi Ultra-Orthodox, see Lehmann / Siebzehner 2006.
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The Moderate stand on politics and piety came to an end after the June 1967
war.While many Jews reacted with joy to the Israeli victory, seeing in it a triumph
of theZionist project at large, formany in theZionistOrthodox camp it signified a
messianic development. Already during the war, the chief military rabbi who was
known for his accommodating rulings, ShlomoGoren, appeared near theWailing
Wall blowing a shofar, ram!s horn, as if to announce the beginning of messianic
times. About a year after the war, a group of a few dozen Zionist Orthodox,
headed by Rabbi Moshe Levinger, settled in Hebron, disregarding government
regulations. In October 1974, this early attempt turned into a large movement,
when thousands marched, and hundreds settled, in newly established posts in
what had been the West Bank of Jordan, and for the Settlers has become Judea
and Samaria.23 For the Orthodox enthusiasts, building their homes in these areas
embodied a messianic purpose. They were taking steps towards the building of
David!s messianic kingdom. The Settlers adopted Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kook as
their spiritual leader and source of inspiration. The son of a chief rabbi and a
mystic, Abraham Isaac Hacohen Kook, Zvi Yehuda took his father!s teachings a
few steps further.24TheLandof Israel has becomea central component and a focal
point of his and his disciples! theology.
The Settlers!movement received enormous boost with the rise of the Likud to
power in 1977, moving from a handful of small shanty towns to nicely built
neighborhoods subsidized by government funding. The Zionist Orthodox have
mobilized politically to defend their settlements frompossible restrictions that the
Israeli government might impose and to ensure government support for the en-
largement of the Settlements project. In spite of the Israeli withdrawal fromGaza,
the Settlers! community has grown considerably, reaching hundreds of thousands
of people. It has created its own subculture, complete with its own dress code, a
mixture of countercultural attire and Ultra-Orthodox norms, and independent
media ventures.
While the Settlers! community is highly devoted to Israel and its sons play a
growing role in itsmilitary,members of the community have at times taken the law
into their hands. In 1983, the Israeli security services discovered cells of under-
ground militants among the Settlers that were stocking arms and ammunition in
preparation for a possible clash with the Israeli state and its security forces, in case
of an Israeli attempt to withdraw from the occupied territories and evacuate the
settlements.25 There have also been at times incidents of violence directed against
Palestinians, allegedly in retaliation against violence directed against Jews. These
have included the destruction of trees, injuring mayors of Palestinian towns, and
the burning of a Palestinian home that resulted in fatalities. While most Settlers
23 On the gradual up hazard building of a large infrastructure of settlements, see
Gorenberg 2007.
24 Aran 1997.
25 Sprinzak 1991; Friedman 1992.
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have not resorted to underground activities or to sabotage or harassment of
Palestinians, the Settlers! camp as a whole has stood on the radical side of the
Israeli political and ideological spectrum and many have come to see it as a
potential obstacle to a peace agreement and to an atmosphere of reconciliation
between Arabs and Jews.
3. Building the Temple
Of special concern for Israeli security, as well as peace-hopefuls, in Israel and
other countries, has been the possibility that messianically-oriented radical Jews
or Christians might heart the Muslim mosques on the Temple Mount and bring
about a regional doomsday.26 In order to appreciate this fear, one has to examine
the role of the Temple and the Land of Israel in Jewish and Christian thought.
The Temple in Jerusalem had been a central institution in Israelite religion, as
well as in the Judaism of the Second Temple period. For Jews of that period, the
Temple served as the ultimate spiritual point on earth, a place where it was
possible for them to atone for their sins and reconcile with God in a definite
manner. Pilgrimages to the Temple in Jerusalem were considered essential rites.
The Temple developed into a unifying symbol for a growingly diverse Jewish
community around theMediterranean world. The destruction of the Temple in 70
CE created therefore a serious vacuum in Jewish communal and spiritual life.
Instead of a physical temple, rabbinical Judaism put its premium on sacred texts,
and promoted a “temple in time”, as the weekly Sabbath had become a holy day,
similar in sanctity to a holy place. Jews purified themselves in honor of the Sab-
bath and entered the holy day in the same manner they would enter a holy place,
cleaning their bodies, wearing special cloths, preparing festive meals, lighting
candles and recite special prayers. Synagogues, “houses of gatherings” inHebrew,
came about during the Second Temple period, and developed, after the Temple!s
destruction, into houses of worship and learning, where Jews prayed and read
sacred texts.
Still, Jews prayed to God to gather them back to Zion, rebuild Jerusalem,
recreate the Temple and enable them to fully atone for their sins. The Temple
came to symbolize redemption. Rabbis spent time on issues relating to the
Temple, its measures, sacrificial system, and the alms and donations presented to
it.Most rabbinical authorities throughout theMiddle-Ages andModernEra have
viewed the Temple Mount as being as sacred as it was when the Temple was
standing.27 The Mishnah, the post-Biblical compilation of lore and law, outlined
the various degrees of sanctity of areas on the Temple Mount and the rituals of
purification people needed to perform in order to enter these areas. Jews have
26 Ariel 2001.
27 Mishnah, TractateMiddot.Measures.
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been required to purify themselves with the ashes of a red heifer before entering
theMount, although there are no longer red heifers to be found. Rabbis have also
feared that Jews might step on restricted sacred ground, such as the Holy of
Holies, onto which ordinary Jews, and even ordinary priests, were not allowed to
enter.Most Jews have accepted the rabbinical ban and sawentrance to theTemple
Mount as taboo. However, Jews had not much to say about the manner in which
the TempleMount was governed. Between the destruction of the Temple in 70CE
and 1967, theTempleMount had been ruled byPagans,Christians andMuslims. In
the seventh and eighth century CE, the new rulers of the city have turned the
mountain into a sacred Muslim site, building a number of mosques and chapels.28
In June 1967, when Israel conquered East Jerusalem, including the Temple
Mount, it symbolized to many Israelis an historical victory, the realization of an
old dream. However, most Israelis did not wish to rebuild the Temple. By this
time, the Temple Mount was a Muslim site, administered by a Muslim Waqf
(religious endowment) and both secular and observant Jews had no interest
anymore in building the Temple. The Israeli government proclaimed its wish to
maintain the status quo antebellum on the Temple Mount as well as in other
Muslim and Christian holy sites and the chief rabbis of that time, Yitzhak Nissim
and Issar Unterman, declared that Jews were forbidden to enter the Temple
Mount. In 1967, voices, such as that of Shlomo Goren, who wished to establish a
synagogue on the Temple Mount, were in the minority. The mood in Israel
changed after the war of 1973. Paradoxically, external threats to Israel!s territorial
gains, whether through war or peace negotiations, have inspired Jewish religious
nationalists to take a proactive stand, including their determination to see the
Temple rebuilt.29
Not all Settlers have been interested in the building of the Temple in an im-
mediate way. Similarly, not all Jewish Temple Builders are Settlers. But the
Temple Builders! movement has shared a great deal theologically, ideologically,
and communally with the Settlers! movement. Since the 1980s, both movements
have been part of Israel!s Radical Right and currently many of the would-be
Temple Builders live in settlements. Groups of Temple-Builders reinterpreted
Jewish texts, putting greater emphasize on sacred space. Rejecting the under-
standing that the building of the Temple should be left for the Messiah to ac-
complish at the Fullness of Time, radical ZionistOrthodox thinkers have declared
the traditional rabbinical ban on entering the Temple Mount to be erroneous.
The first organization of Temple-Builders was the Temple Mount and Land of
Israel Faithful. Led by Gershon Solomon, a disabled IDF veteran and a lawyer,
the Temple Mount Faithful gave voice at its inception, in the 1970s, to a large
variety of Jews interested in the building of the Temple. Its periodic attempts to
enter the Temple Mount, and organize prayers there, have enjoyed much media
28 On the Temple Mount, see Reiter 2001.
29 Inbari 2012.
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coverage. In the 1980s, Rabbi Joel Bin Nun, a leader of the now defunct Gush
Emunim, the Settlers!major organization in the 1970s, established an institute for
the halachic study of the building of the Temple. In a series of publications he
pointed to what he considered to be the merits of the Temple and the sacrifices
therein, which he believes would help reconcile God and humanity, and would
therefore help bring about a messianic age. Other groups that formed during the
1980s–2010s, have included:Reshit-Yerushaliim, Jerusalem First, anAcademy for
studying Jerusalem and the Temple; Ha Tnuaa Lekinun ha Mikdash, the Move-
ment for the Building of the Temple; Yeshivat Torat HaBayit, The Temple-Laws
Yeshiva; El Har Adonai, Unto the Mountain of the Lord; Ha Tnuaa LeShihrur
Har HaBayit, the Movement for the Liberation of the Temple Mount; and Yes-
hivat Ateret Cohanim, The Priest!s Crown Yeshiva, to name just a few of the
groups.30
Jewish movements that have strived to build the Temple would not have car-
ried their activities the way they did if it were not for evangelical Christians
providing encouragement and assistance. Christian thinkers had traditionally
seen the Temple as redundant after Jesus! sacrifice on the Cross, and interpreted
the destruction of the Temple in 70 CE as resulting from the Jewish unwillingness
to acknowledge Jesus! role and mission. The idea that the Jews should go back to
Palestine and rebuild Jerusalem and the Temple became predominant among
Christian messianic groups, especially pietist and evangelical Protestants. After
the 1967 war, evangelicals with messianic yearnings have come more than before
to expect the building of the Temple at the end of the current era, in preparation
for the return of the Messiah to earth. In such scenarios, it is often Antichrist, an
imposter of the Messiah, who is expected to achieve global power that would
initiate the building of the Temple. TheTemple, or rather its rebuilding, seemed to
evangelical Christians to be the one event standing between this era and the next.
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, premillennialist Christians and groups of na-
tionalist-Orthodox Jews, who were interested in the building of the Temple, dis-
covered each other. SuchChristians have received reassurance for theirmessianic
faith from Jews who were studying the Temple rituals, or manufacturing utensils
to be used for sacrificial purposes according to biblical or Talmudic measures, or
trying to breed a new brand of heifers. Similarly, Orthodox Jews received re-
assurances fromChristian interest and support. Initially, Jewish proponents of the
building of the Temple did not appreciate the Christian faith more than Christian
messianic groups appreciated the intrinsic value of the Jewish faith, but they saw
such details as being beside the point. The important thing for them has been the
Christian willingness to support their work.31
Christian proponents of building the Temple have made efforts to discover the
exact site of the Temple. Some have searched for the lost Ark of the Covenant,
30 Inbari 2009.
31 Ariel 2013, pp. 198–213.
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adding a touch of adventure and mystery to a potentially explosive topic. The
search for the “Lost Ark” has inspired a number of novels and a movie based in
part on a real life figure. Some premillennialist evangelicals have also searched for
the ashes of the red heifer, which are necessary, according to the Jewish law, in
order to allow Jews to enter the Temple Mount, while others have supported
Jewish attempts at breeding red heifers or began breeding such heifers on their
own.
Pat Robertson, the renowned leader of the 700 Club and a one-time presi-
dential hopeful, offered his support and hospitality to Gershon Solomon. In
August 1991, the 700 Club aired an interview with Solomon. Robertson described
Solomon!s group as struggling to gain the rightful place on the Temple Mount.
“We will never have peace”, Robertson declared, “until the Mount of the House
of theLord is restored.” Solomon, for his part, described hismission as embodying
the promise for a universal redemption. “It!s not just a struggle for the Temple
Mount, it!s a struggle for the […] redemption of the world”, he declared.
Examination of the mutual enchantment between evangelical Christians and
Orthodox Jews, such as Robertson and Solomon, shows mutual influences. So-
lomon, for example, claims to have divine revelations, not unlike those among
evangelical charismatic Christians. Jewish would-be builders of the Temple have
also changed their opinion onChristians, impressed by the keenChristian interest
and support.32 Those Christians, they discovered, were more enthusiastic about
the prospect of building the Temple thanmost Jews. The theology andmessage of
people, such as Gershon Solomon, has come to include Christians as important
participants in the divine drama of salvation. Resurfacing the traditional Jewish
idea that since the days of Noah all of humanity is in covenant with God, Jewish
radical thinkers of the Settlers camp are claiming that Christians too have to strive
and make an effort towards the advancement of the messianic times.
In assessing the tensions embodied in the struggle for the Temple Mount, one
needs to take into consideration not only the messianic fervor of Jews and
Christians, but the strong feelings of the localMuslim community and the support
and sympathy of Muslims worldwide. An adversarial symbiosis has developed at
times between Muslims and the Jewish and Christian Temple Builders. The
agenda of some Jewish andChristian groups, whowish to change the status quo on
the Temple Mount, has served to fuel and enhance the Palestinian claims.
Throughout the 1970s–2010s, the Temple Mount, or the Haram al Sharif as it is
known to Muslims, became a symbol of national liberation for Palestinian Mus-
lims and their regard for the Mount has become even more pronounced. Sover-
eignty over the Mount played a prominent part in the peace talks that took place
between Palestinians and Israelis in the late 1990s, and Ariel Sharon!s visit to the
Temple Mount in September 2000 was the starting point of the Second Intifada.
Protecting the Temple Mount mosques became a priority for the Israeli security
32 Ibid.
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services. Even symbolic attempts to claim the TempleMount as a Jewish site have
had explosive consequences. On Sukkot, the Feast of the Tabernacles, in October
1990, the Temple Mount Faithful planned to enter the Temple Mount, and this
time to lay a corner stone for the future Temple. The police, however, refused to
allow them entrance to the Temple Mount and they left the place. But Muslim
worshipers on theMount felt threatened, and threw rocks at Jewish worshipers at
the Wailing Wall. The atmosphere became volatile, as Muslim demonstrators
chased the small police unit out of the Mountain, and Israeli anti-riot police
stormed the area a short while later. Dozens of demonstrators and police officers
were killed or wounded. The possibility that acts inspired by groups holding to
messianic hopes would bring about a mini-apocalypse therefore became a con-
cern for those taking interest in the developments in the Middle East. Should the
mosques be seriously damaged, all hell might break loose.
4. Conclusion
At first glance Ultra-Orthodoxy and Zionist-Orthodoxy are very different com-
munities that hold to ideologies far removed from each other and subscribe to
very different life styles. A closer look reveals, however, strong similarities be-
tween the world views, agendas and life decisions of the Ultra and Zionist Or-
thodox. Both groups relate with owe to the Jewish sacred texts as the foundation
of their religious tradition. Both view the biblical narratives as the basis of what
they consider to be the special relationship betweenGod, the people of Israel, and
the Land of Israel. Both communities are thoroughlymessianic in their theologies
and yearnings, directing their lives towards the arrival of the messianic times. The
two groups have promoted different paths to achieve that goal. Since 1967, the
Zionist Orthodox have become more nationalist and right wing than other seg-
ments of the Jewish population. However, while the Ultra-Orthodox have tra-
ditionally resented the politically pro-active expansionist Zionist agenda, they too
see themselves as troopers in God!s army, struggling, through prayers, studies and
righteous lives to bring in themessianic age. A number ofUltra-Orthodox groups,
most notably the Hasidic group Chabad, have also become engaged in outreach,
wishing to bring more people to fulfill the commandments as a means of ushering
in the messianic times. Within the Zionist Orthodox movement, the standards of
daily observance and commitment to studying Talmudic texts have also grown
considerably.
The differences in life decisions have also become narrower. The Zionist Or-
thodox have embraced modern science, incorporated liberal education alongside
the study of sacred texts, and have allowed women a growing amount of tradi-
tional education. Zionist Orthodox women have abandoned, however, the more
carefree attire and personal appearance in favor of full cover of their hair and
body and while they study, obtain degrees, and build careers, they make a greater
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effort at pro-creation than their mothers have made, and in such a way help
enlarge the community and ensure the continuity of the Jewish people. In that
both groups have been successful. Their numbers and role within the Jewish
community has been on the rise, altering the character and agendas of the Jewish
people as a whole.
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